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Bentham's Fictions: Canon and Idolatry
in the Genealogy of Law
Robert A. Yelle*
"The case is this. A large portion of the body of the Law was, by the
bigotry or artifice of lawyers, locked up in an illegible character, and in a
foreign tongue. The statute [Blackstone] mentions obliged them to give up
their hieroglyphics, and to restore the native language to its rights. This
was doing much; but it was not doing everything. Fiction, tautology,
technicality, circuity, irregularity, inconsistency remain. But above all, the
pestilential breath of Fiction poisons the sense of every instrument it
comes near."'
* Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Toronto. I gratefully acknowledge the criticisms of
this essay and suggestions for its improvement made by the following individuals: James Crimmins,
Eisel Mazard, David Lieberman, Jonathan Z. Smith, Mariana Valverde, and Winnifred Sullivan. I
would like additionally to thank those who participated in discussions of the paper in two venues: the
Legal History Seminar led by Jim Phillips at the University of Toronto Law School, and the 2003
American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting.
1. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON
GOVERNMENT 411 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977).
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"I have been mainly concerned here with the subject of fictions.
Properly understood, are they not a telling illustration of the fact that
knowledge-the fullest possible awareness-of the nature of law is the
true way of escape from its shackles?"2
INTRODUCTION: TOWARD A GENEALOGY OF LEGAL ICONOCLASM
Positivists contend that law is separate from other domains of culture,
including especially morals and religion.3 The canon of the law is
supposed to be self-contained. Whatever exists outside its margins is not
law. The authority of this canon consists, in significant part, of the
impossibility of confusion or commingling with other, lesser norms.
Already in its exclusiveness, however, law betrays a kinship with other
domains of culture, especially religion, which shares a predilection for
canon.4 The historian of religion Jonathan Z. Smith argues that "the
radical and arbitrary reduction represented by the notion of canon and the
ingenuity represented by the rule-governed exegetical enterprise of
applying the canon to every dimension of human life is that most
characteristic, persistent, and obsessive religious activity."5 Recognizing
that the impulse toward canon is also distinctive of many legal traditions,
Smith suggests that in the future, "students of religion might find as their
most congenial colleagues those concerned with ...legal studies."6 In
modernity, the most common form of legal canon is the "code"-the
reduction of the law to a set of written statutes that is, ideally, complete,
concise, and unambiguous. This poses a paradox: If law and religion
coincide precisely at the point at which each claims to be most
distinctive-namely, in its embodiment in a clearly delimited canon-then
perhaps they are more alike than legal positivists care to admit?
Canon embodies the dream of a fully self-present discourse that is,
impossibly, both complete and closed. Although Smith emphasizes the
freedom enabled by the creative exegesis of a canon, the impulse toward
canon can become virulently restrictive. Not only the words of the canon,
but the permissible interpretations of these words may be limited in such a
way as to exclude metaphorical or non-literal meaning. By purging
2. Owen Barfield, Poetic Diction and Legal Fiction, in THE REDISCOVERY OF MEANING, AND
OTHER ESSAYS 44, 64 (1977).
3. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 596-
97, 616 (1958) (quoting John Austin on the separation of law from religion).
4. See, e.g., AUTHORITY, ANXIETY, AND CANON: ESSAYS IN VEDIC INTERPRETATION (Laurie L.
Patton ed., 1994); WILLIAM GRAHAM, BEYOND THE WRITTEN WORD: ORAL ASPECTS OF SCRIPTURE
IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION (1987); RETHINKING SCRIPTURE: ESSAYS FROM A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (Miriam Levering ed., 1989).
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themselves of linguistic uncertainties, law and religion often aspire to be
transparent and perfect languages. Modem law, like certain forms of
religious fundamentalism, has established its authority as a form of
literalism, in opposition to literature and other aesthetic discourses.7 This
strategic exclusion reinforces the status of law as not merely a language of
command, but a metalanguage, a discourse that rules over other
discourses.8
The present essay explores what is at stake in the impulse toward canon,
and simultaneously calls into question the separation between law and
religion, through a study of the English utilitarian philosopher and legal
reformer Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). Bentham's proposal for the
"codification" of the law, a term he invented,9 was closely connected with
his critique of linguistic "fictions" that were to be expelled from the legal
code, or even from language itself. His goal was to fix the meaning of
terms and produce a language that was not only unambiguous, but also
devoid of synonyms. Not only must every word have a single meaning,
but every idea must be represented by one and only one word: "Identity of
nomenclature is certificate of identity of nature: diversity of diversity:-
how absurd, how inconsistent to make the certificate a false one!"'" The
same goal informed his ideal of a legal code, or "Pannomion," which was
to contain the whole law and nothing but the law. I'
These proposals were heavily influenced by Protestant theology. During
the Reformation, Protestants located religion increasingly in the literal
interpretation of a canon of scripture, as opposed to the "idolatrous"
customs of the Catholic Church. Bentham's proposal for the codification
of the still largely customary English common law marked a similar
relocation of the legal tradition. However, it was in his critique of fictions,
including the common law itself, that the structural and historical
connections with Protestant theology were most evident. Bentham labeled
these illusions of language as forms of verbal "idolatry." His linguistic
iconoclasm was not without precedent. During the Reformation, Protestant
theologians had applied the prohibition against idolatry to language,
extending this charge beyond its scriptural intendment. British
7. See LAW AND THE IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND THE AESTHETICS OF LAW (Costas
Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., 1999).
8. Cf Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 805, 820 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987).
9. See The Bentham Project, Neologisms of Jeremy Bentham, at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/Bentham-
Project/Faqs/neo-c.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).
10. 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, A Manual of Political Economy, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
30, 73 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843) [hereinafter Political Economy]; cf 3
JEREMY BENTHAM, A General View of a Complete Code of Laws, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM, supra, at 155, 209 [hereinafter A General View].
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philosophers before Bentham, including Francis Bacon (1561-1626),
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), and John Locke (1632-1704), had further
developed such applications, especially by condemning the reification or
personification of words in terms often borrowed from theologians.
Bentham himself drew directly from scripture and theology in extending
these criticisms of verbal idolatry.
In Bentham's case, the structural analogy between law and religion
suggested by their mutual dependence on canon turns out to signal a
deeper, genealogical relation of law to religious iconoclasm. Moreover,
his case was not idiosyncratic. Peter Goodrich has shown that the common
law in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England established its
authority through an "antirrhetic," an attack on the power of images that
borrowed from Reformation iconoclasm.12 Polemics originally directed
against Catholic ritual were applied to purify the language of the law. Law
defined itself against an excluded, idolatrous Other. Costas Douzinas and
Lynda Nead concur that "after the Reformation and the fusion of secular
and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, iconophobic ideas became the explicit
foundation upon which the common law was established."13 The critique
of idolatry was transposed to the domain of language and became an
"internalization of iconoclasm to the text." 14 The law sealed itself off, both
hermetically and hermeneutically, from other domains of culture, while
paradoxically presenting itself as a universal language that had the power
to translate every other discourse into its own idiom. The claim of law to
constitute a perfect language was made possible by an exclusion or
repression of verbal images.15 Other critical legal scholars have argued
similarly, though without specific reference to religious iconoclasm, that
law constitutes a special mode of rhetoric, the distinguishing characteristic
of which is that it denies or represses its own rhetorical nature in order to
establish its superiority to other, more obvious forms of rhetoric. Stanley
Fish states that "the law is at once thoroughly rhetorical and engaged in
the effacing of its own rhetoricity."' 6 Peter Fitzpatrick refers to law as a
"mythology" or even, borrowing Jacques Derrida's term, a "white
mythology,"" a mode of rhetoric that erases or obscures its own nature as
such. To counteract such mythologies, Goodrich calls for a genealogy
12. PETER GOODRICH, OEDIPUS LEX: PSYCHOANALYSIS, HISTORY, LAW (1995).
13. Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead, Introduction to LAW AND THE IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY OF
ART AND THE AESTHETICS OF LAW, supra note 7, at 1, 8-9.
14. Id. at9.
15. Id. at 3-4.
16. Stanley Fish, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in THE FATE OF LAW 159, 195
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Keams eds., 1991).
17. PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 32-33 (1992); cf. JACQUES
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"that is cognizant of a poetics repressed within institutional prose, of an
affectivity harbored in its science, a power in its reason, an image in its
logic, a justice in its law."' 8
Taking the lead from such prior scholarship, my analysis of Bentham
contributes to a genealogy of law that points to the origins of modem,
"secular" law in an earlier, religious opposition between canon and
idolatry. Although best known as a radical reformer of the common-law
tradition, who insisted on replacing its customary law with a written code,
Bentham represented a further development of the repression of images
that Goodrich identifies at an earlier stage of that tradition. Bentham
turned the critique of idolatry against the common law itself. This brings
us one step closer to modem law, and suggests that, behind the mask of
legal reason, there may lie the image of another god whose disciples we
lawyers remain. Given Bentham's influence on modem law, as both the
leading proponent of codification and one of the founding figures of
Utilitarianism and legal positivism, the recovery of such neglected
religious influences on his jurisprudence is of vital importance.
The question of whether modem, secular law is "religious," though it
may be unanswerable, can be approached through a reconsideration of
Bentham's own religion. Arguably an atheist, Bentham worked hard to
separate law from religion. Early in his career, he declared that "utility,"
the only rational basis for law, was not only occasionally but eternally
opposed to "asceticism," which pursued pain for its own sake, or rather for
the sake of outmoded religious ideals. 9 Throughout his writings, he
consistently sought to reform the law to replace the "religious sanction,"
which in his view had ceased to become effective as a ground of law.2°
These positions represented a radical departure from, and indeed a direct
assault upon, Sir William Blackstone's (1723-80) view that "Christianity
is part of the laws of England."' 21 Following Bentham, John Austin (1790-
1859) rejected Blackstone's view that laws that conflicted with divine law
were not valid. 22 In the last century, Herbert Hart (1907-1992) quoted this
argument of Austin in the course of making his own claim that law is
18. GOODRICH, supra note 12, at 30.
19. 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 1, 4-6.
20. PHILIP BEAUCHAMP [JEREMY BENTHAM AND GEORGE GROTE], AN ANALYSIS OF THE
INFLUENCE OF NATURAL RELIGION ON THE TEMPORAL HAPPINESS OF MANKIND (London, R. Carlile
1822), republished as THE INFLUENCE OF NATURAL RELIGION ON THE TEMPORAL HAPPINESS OF
MANKIND 82-94 (Prometheus Books 2003). The term "religious sanction" is defined in 1 BENTHAM,
supra note 19, at 14-15.
21. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59.
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separate from morals.2 3 Such denials of a connection between law and
religion help to maintain the self-image of law as "secular" and rational.
However, a recovery of the historical influence of religion on Bentham's
jurisprudence, precisely at the point of separation of law in a self-
contained code, calls into question the positivists' autobiography and
family history of modem law as "secular." The separation of law from
religion appears to have roots deep in the Reformation opposition between
canon and idolatry.
My argument will proceed in several stages. First, I will provide some
historical background on Bentham's codification proposal, and explain
what he meant by "fictions" of both the specifically legal and the more
broadly linguistic variety. Then I will summarize the history of the
religious opposition of canon to idolatry and describe how such ideas were
applied to language, initially by Protestant theologians and subsequently
by an ostensibly secular philosophical tradition. Next I will show how
Bentham drew on such religious and secular traditions for his critique of
fictions. Then I will use several of Bentham's writings on religion to raise
again the question of whether he was "religious" or an "atheist." I will
conclude by suggesting the function of iconoclasm in an economy of
representation, and the implications for the broader question of whether
and in what sense modem law may be called "religious."
THE FRICTION WITH FICTIONS
In seventeenth-century England, a number of proposals sought to
replace common law with a simple code derived, in some cases, from the
Bible.24 Barbara Shapiro notes that such "radical" movements, prominent
during the Revolution and Protectorate (1640-1660), subsequently
diminished.25 Unlike some of these earlier reformers, Bentham did not
propose to turn to religion as a source of law. Indeed, he disapproved of
the code developed in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in the 1630s and
1640s, which borrowed from Biblical law, most notably by using the Ten
Commandments as a framework for defining capital crimes. 26 However,
Gerald Postema's analogy between Bentham's codification proposal and
that of the radical Levellers is apposite.27 Just as some earlier movements
23. See Hart, supra note 3.
24. Barbara Shapiro, Codification of the Laws in Seventeenth Century England, 1974 Wis. L.
REV. 428, 430, 449-50, 455 (1974).
25. Id. at430.
26. Cf BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 25-27, 200. See, for the code in question, THE BOOK OF THE
GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF ThE MASSACHUSETS (facsimile
ed., The Huntington Library 1975) (1648). See generally GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAW AND
AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS (1960) for a comprehensive account of these developments.
27. Cf GERALD POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 425 (1986).
[Vol. 17:151
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had done, Bentham depicted his project as an extension of the religious
Reformation. The Protestant emphasis on a written canon of scripture to
the exclusion of unwritten custom, combined with the translation of that
canon into the vernacular and an emphasis on its literal meaning, had
made religion more democratic. Bentham hoped to do the same for the
law. Postema explains that Bentham "prided himself on being the 'Luther
of Jurisprudence' and it was precisely at this point that his jurisprudential
Protestantism is most pronounced. Just as access to God was not to be
mediated by priests, so too access to the law was not to be mediated by
professional lawyers."28 Bentham also made a "comparison between the
mysteries of the law and lawyer craft and those of religion and priest
craft."29 The remedy for both "Jurisprudential and Ecclesiastical
Superstition [s]" was to be found in codification, or "the forming a Digest
of the Law," which was "to Lawyers, what the making a translation of the
Bible was to Church men."3 Such translations had put religion into the
hands of individuals. Similarly, Bentham hoped through codification to
make "every man his own lawyer."'" Otherwise, the real legislator of the
common law would be the person who reduced its principles to a written
compilation," just as the bookbinder might usurp the authorship of the
Bible by adding to Jesus's own words.33 Of course, there were important
differences between Bentham's codification proposal and the Reformation
idea of a scriptural canon, one of the most obvious of which was that
Protestants had attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to fix religion in a
timeless and unalterable form ostensibly dictated by God and subject to no
amendments, whereas Bentham placed great emphasis on the continual
improvement of the law by the legislature. His code was supposed to be
comprehensive and authoritative, but not eternal.
28. Id. at 425; see also H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 29 (1982). The phrase "Luther of
Jurisprudence" appears at 7 JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 1,270.
29. HART, supra note 28, at 29; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, CHURCH-OF-ENGLANDISM AND ITS
CATECHISM EXAMINED, Introduction, 229-30 (London, Effingham Wilson 1818); 6 JEREMY
BENTHAM, Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM,
supra note 10, at 1, 11; 7 BENTHAM, supra note 28, at 210; 8 JEREMY BENTHAM, A Fragment on
Ontology, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 193, 199.
30. Jeremy Bentham, University College Manuscript Collection, at xcvii.94-95, xxvii.124, quoted
in DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 253 (1989).
31. 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, Bentham 's Draught for the Organization of Judicial Establishments, in
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 305, 332; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, Auto-
Icon; or, Farther Uses of the Dead to the Living, in BENTHAM'S AUTO-ICON AND RELATED WRITINGS
2 (James Crimmins ed., 2002); 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, Truth Versus Ashhurst, in THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 231, 236; 7 BENTHAM, supra note 28, at 189.
32. 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, Jeremy Bentham to His Fellow-Citizens of France, on Houses of Peers
and Senates, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 419, 484.
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This parallel between Bentham's legal reforms and the earlier religious
Reformation highlights their common dependence on the growth of
printing and literacy that came with the technological innovation of
movable type. The shared emphasis on writing, and corresponding attack
on unwritten custom, was to this extent a reflection of developments in
material culture. However, the literalism advocated by Bentham and
earlier Protestants was more than an emphasis on letters: It constituted
nothing less than a theology of the book, which opposed a written canon
to idolatrous custom. In this respect, Bentham's codification proposal and
critique of fictions resembled the common law's earlier polemic against
images, which Goodrich similarly attributed to the rise of print culture.34
At the time Bentham advocated his reforms, the common law was still a
disorganized and only partly written tradition, couched in an arcane
terminology taken from Latin and Norman French. He proposed
codification as a remedy for the ills of the common law, including
especially its traditionalism, lack of system, uncertainty, secrecy, and
unintelligibility. The quote from Bentham appended as an epigraph at the
beginning of this essay refers to a statute requiring the use of English as
the language of the law. This was actually a process that began in 1362
with the Statute of Pleading, which required proceedings to be conducted
in English, but provided for records to be made in Latin. 35 Cromwell's
requirement to use English as the language of the records, reversed under
Charles II, was again enforced by George 11.36 Blackstone summarized this
history, and expressed ambivalence regarding the abandonment of Latin
and other elements of the lawyer's technical language.37 For Bentham,
however, even the adoption of English as the language of the law did not
-go far enough, as it left in place the reliance on custom and the use of
"fictions." Fictions were the disease for which codification would provide
the cure. A number of scholars have provided illuminating interpretations
of Bentham's concept of fictions,38 although none has previously noted the
34. GOODRICH, supra note 12, at 11, 44, 65, 103 n.146. See, for a broader consideration of the
influence of print culture on law, Richard J. Ross, The Commoning of the Common Law: The
Renaissance Debate over Printing English Law, 1520-1640, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 323 (1998); Richard
J. Ross, The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers: Memory as Keyword, Shelter, and
Identity, 1560-1640, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229 (1998).
35. 36 Edw. 3 c.15 (1326).
36. 4 Geo. 2 c.26 (1731).
37. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *317-23.
38. See LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967); HART, supra note 28, at 21-39; MARY MACK,
JEREMY BENTHAM: AN ODYSSEY OF IDEAS 151-203 (1963); CHARLES K. OGDEN, BENTHAM'S
THEORY OF FICTIONS (1932); JAMES STEINTRAGER, BENTHAM 20-43 (1977); Bernard Jackson,
Bentham, Truth and the Semiotics of Law, 51 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 493 (1998); Gerald Postema,
Fact, Fictions, and Law: Bentham on the Foundations of Evidence, in FACTS IN LAW 37 (William
Twining ed., 1983); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Bentham's Theory of Fictions: A "Curious Double
Language ", 11 CARDOZO J. LAW & LIT. 223 (1999).
[Vol. 17:151
8
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol17/iss2/1
2005]
extent of its religious dimensions. "Fiction" had both narrower and
broader meanings for Bentham-as applied to jurisprudence ("legal
fictions" or "the fictions of lawyers") and as applied to language in
general ("fictions"). Each of these meanings will be taken up in turn.
"Fiction" as a term of art in jurisprudence goes back to classical Roman
law. 39 This ancient meaning was summed up by Henry Maine (1822-88):
"Fictio, in old Roman law, is properly a term of pleading, and signifies a
false averment on the part of the plaintiff which the defendant was not
allowed to traverse ... ."'I Fictions were false statements made to fit a case
within prescribed forms of pleading, or within the jurisdiction of a
particular court. For example, if a plaintiff wanted to try a case in the
Court of King's Bench rather than that of Common Pleas, he had to assert
that the defendant was in the custody of the Marshall of the King's Bench
Prison-whether or not such was the case.41 Another fiction arose in
response to the requirement that, before a trial could proceed, a plaintiff
must guarantee his ability to pay if judgment went against him. This could
be done by having others act as guarantors. The fiction was to claim that
the non-existent persons "John Doe" and "Richard Roe" had agreed to act
in this capacity4-an averment that involved winks, nudges, and the
greasing of palms. Often such devices had arisen as a means of
accommodating changes in the law without altering the traditional forms
of legal process. The absence of systematic statutory reform meant that
changes in the law had accommodated to these traditional forms, resulting
in a kind of patchwork or crazy-quilt rent by numerous holes. Maine, who
defended fictions as an historically important mechanism of legal reform,
defined them as follows:
But now I employ the expression "Legal Fiction" to signify any
assumption which conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule
of law has undergone alteration, its letter remaining unchanged, its
operation being modified .... The fact is . . .that the law has been
wholly changed; thefiction is that it remains what it always was.43
Bentham extrapolated from such traditional devices to a broader concept
of legal fiction that encompassed any case in which there was a gap
between the reality and the language of the law. He included in this
concept such devices as pro forma notice, judicial oaths (in which the
39. See, e.g., QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA 5.10.95-99, translated in THE ORATOR'S
EDUCATION 415-17 (Loeb Classical Library 2001).
40. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENTLAW 24 (Beacon Press 1963) (1861).
41. See John Hill Burton, Introduction to the Study of Bentham's Works, in I BENTHAM, in THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 5, 41.
42. 7 BENTHAM, supra note 28, at 284.
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swearers no longer believed), and laws that had become so badly outdated
that they were respected in name only. John Hill Burton summed up
Bentham's view that "a Fiction of Law may be defined in general as the
saying something exists which does not exist, and acting as if it existed; or
vice versa."
44
Although Bentham reviled the mindless continuance of legal traditions,
he objected even more to the usurpation of the authority of the legislature
by the courts that occurred when the letter of the law was disregarded: "A
fiction of law may be defined a wilful falsehood, having for its object the
stealing legislative power ... Bentham's critique of fictions brought
him into opposition not only with particular abuses of law by the courts,
but also with the whole judge-made tradition of common law. Maine
followed Bentham in terming case law in its entirety a "fiction," though
without the same pejorative sense.46 The analogical extension of
precedent, in the form of largely unwritten principles of custom, to new
fact scenarios inevitably involved a kind of fiction, a stretching if not a
breaking of the language of the law. Bentham argued that if change was
needed in the law, then it should occur explicitly through legislation.
Otherwise, anyone could bend the law to suit his own interests, and no
person would ever know what the law actually was, which would defeat
its function as a guide to conduct. The solution lay in continual reform of
the law by the legislature, especially through codification, or the reduction
of the law to a set of explicit written principles unequivocal in meaning.
Fictions were a pathology of the law that could be cured through
codification, which would fix the law in a written text, while at the same
time allowing the flexibility of changing it.
For Bentham, the term "fiction" also had a broader meaning beyond
jurisprudence. This meaning was elaborated in his writings on language
and logic. He argued that "[iln language the words which present
themselves, and are employed in the character of names, are, some of
them, names of real entities,-others, names of fictitious entities; and to
one or other of these classes may all words which are employed in the
character of names be referred.947 Bentham subscribed to a nominalist
philosophy according to which words that were not fictions referred to
individual existing things. Abstract terms were derived from concrete
ones, and class terms were fictions abstracted from individual members, as
"Church" meant in reality only the members of the clergy. 48 Bentham
44. Burton, supra note 41, at 41.
45. 3 BENTHAM, A General View, supra note 10, at 509.
46. MAINE, supra note 40, at 26.
47. 8 BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 198.
48. 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, The Book of Fallacies, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM,_supra
note 10, at 373, 448-49; cf. 8 JEREMY BENTHAM, Essay on Logic, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY
[Vol. 17:151
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acknowledged the utility, indeed the necessity, of some fictions in logic
and language: "[B]ut for ... fiction, the language of man could not have
risen above the language of brutes.,49 Fictions served as a kind of
shorthand and could enrich language through figuration.5 0 However, in
certain circumstances their use was pernicious. Lawyers in particular used
fictions to serve their own interests:
By the priest and the lawyer, in whatsoever shape fiction has been
employed, it has had for its object or effect, or both, to deceive, and,
by deception, to govern, and, by governing, to promote the interest,
real or supRposed, of the party addressing, at the expense of the party
addressed.
The antidote for fictions was to trace them back to their ultimate basis in
reality, if such existed: For example, instead of "Church," say "clergy."
This eventually led Bentham to adopt "the substantive-preferring
principle," a preference for the use of nouns over verbs, which meant
replacing many complex verbs with simpler verbs such as "have" or
"take," combined with noun phrases.
52
In his attempt to classify and purify language, Bentham followed a
British philosophical tradition that extended back to Bacon, and that is
represented in modern times by analytical philosophers, some of whom
acknowledge Bentham's contribution to their endeavors.53 This tradition
was united by the effort to produce a perfect, universal, or fully rational
language through the elimination of logical errors. A late representative of
this tradition, Charles K. Ogden (1889-1957), snatched Bentham's theory
of fictions from the dustbin of history54 in order to give philosophical
support to his proposal for a "Basic English" consisting only of the most
common and useful terms, shorn of redundancy and ambiguity.5 5 Within
this tradition, Bentham expressed his debt to Locke, John Home Tooke
(1736-1812), and, for the idea of "fictitious beings," the encyclopedist
Jean Le Rond D'Alembert (1717-83).56 Among these figures, Locke was
BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 212, 250.
49. 8 JEREMY BENTHAM, Chrestomathia, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 10, at
4, 119; see also 8 BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 198.
50. See 8 JEREMY BENTHAM, Essay on Language, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra
note 10, at 295, 318-19.
51. 8 BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 199; see also L.J. Hume, The Political Functions ofBentham's
Theory of Fictions, THE BENTHAM NEWSLETTER, Dec. 1979, at 18, 19.
52. See MACK, supra note 38, at 196.
53. E.g., WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 39,42 (2d ed. 1980).
54. OGDEN, supra note 38.
55. CHARLES K. OGDEN, BASIC ENGLISH: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION WITH RULES AND
GRAMMAR (1930).
56. See Emmanuelle de Champs, The Place of Jeremy Bentham's Theory of Fictions in
Eighteenth-Century Linguistic Thought, 2 J. BENTHAM STUD. (1999), at
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perhaps the most important and influential precedent. His empiricism,
which traced all ideas back to sensory impressions and ultimately to
perceptible entities, led Locke to excoriate abuses of language occasioned
by the use of abstract or metaphysical terms and to suggest the desirability
of a dictionary consisting only of those terms, the really existing correlates
of which could be verified by experience.57 Bentham also evinced the
58hope that one might arrive at such a dictionary. He proposed first to
analyze words into simple ideas, then to classify these through a method
of bifurcation or division modeled on Linnaean classification.59 The first
division of this classification was that which separated real entities from
fictitious ones.
The location of Bentham in this apparently secular philosophical
tradition identifies him as a representative, within the field of law, of the
Enlightenment. However, Bentham's proposal for a legal code, or beyond
that a rationalized language, was influenced also by the Reformation
emphasis on the literal interpretation of a canon of scripture. British
philosophers, beginning with Bacon and especially Hobbes, applied the
religious prohibition against idolatry to certain habits of language,
particularly the reification or personification of words. Bentham's
complaint against fictions extended this tradition, combining it with
scripture and theology to label the common law a form of verbal idolatry.
STATUTES V. STATUES
To show how this happened, it will be necessary, especially for those
unfamiliar with the Reformation, to provide some historical background.
The prohibition against idolatry goes back to the Ten Commandments,
which were supposedly given by God to Moses on Mount Sinai.60 These
laws stated in part:
You shall have no other gods before me. You shall not make for
yourself a graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven
above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the
earth; you shall not bow down to them or serve them, for I the Lord
your God am a jealous god.... 6 '
Idolatry, which strictly referred to the making and worship of images, also
implied the repudiation of monotheism, or of the worship of the one true
discussion of Bentham's dependence on these authors.
57. 2 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 163 (Dover 1959) (1690).
58. 8 BENTHAM, supra note 49, at 106-07.
59. 8 id. at 121-26; see also LIEBERMAN, supra note 30, at 263; POSTEMA, supra note 27, at 433.
60. Exodus 20.
61. Exodus 20:3-5 (Revised Standard).
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God, and the embrace of "strange gods '62 or even polytheism. 63 The
importance of the prohibition against idolatry was signaled by its
placement near the beginning of the Ten Commandments. These were
supposedly inscribed by the hand of God Himself, and therefore in a sense
already embodied the opposition between canon and idolatry.
Christians inherited the prohibition against idolatry from Judaism and
interpreted it in ways that allowed such practices as the making of images
of Jesus Christ or of the saints. Although images (called "icons" in Greek)
could not be the focus of worship (latria, as in "idolatry"), they could,
according to their defenders, be objects of a lesser degree of reverence
(dulia).64 Disputes over the permissibility of such images motivated the
iconoclastic ("icon-breaking") controversy in the Byzantine church in the
eighth century. 65 During the Reformation that began in sixteenth-century
Europe, Protestants applied a more restrictive interpretation of the
scriptural prohibition against idolatry, leveled the charge of idolatry
against certain ceremonies of the Catholic Church, and destroyed many
images of saints and other appurtenances of ritual.66
Although Judaism and Christianity had long emphasized the importance
of a canon of scripture, the Reformation deepened this emphasis with the
doctrine of sola scriptura or scripture alone as the source of religious
authority, to the exclusion of the customs of the Catholic Church. In this
context, what scripture said assumed greater importance; and increasing
weight was placed both on translating the Bible into the vernacular and on
interpreting its words literally. For Protestants, the Bible was supposed to
be transparent in meaning, or at least could be made so through scholarly
interpretation and translation. The Catholic Church was no longer needed
as custodian, messenger, and interpreter of God's word. As previously
mentioned, these developments were largely a result of the ascendancy of
the printed book. However, there were also theological factors underlying
these developments. Protestants deepened the structural opposition
between canon and idolatry, and increasingly applied this opposition to
different types of language. As canon came to mean not merely a corpus
of writings, but also a mode of literalism or "plain style,, 67 idolatry was
increasingly taken to include figurative speech, verbal images, and
unwritten customs, all of which lacked the certainty of scripture.
62. Exodus 20:3 (Douay-Rheims).
63. See MOSHE HALBERTAL & AVISHAI MARGALIT, IDOLATRY (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1992)
for an excellent analysis of the meaning of idolatry within the Jewish tradition and beyond.
64. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 430 (2d ed. 1974).
65. D. J. SAHA, ICON AND LOGOS: SOURCES IN EIGHTH-CENTURY ICONOCLASM (1988).
66. CARLOS M.N. EIRE, WAR AGAINST THE IDOLS: THE REFORMATION OF WORSHIP FROM
ERASMUS TO CALVIN (1986).
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Protestant literalism rested in part on a sharpened distinction between
literal and metaphorical meaning. The Catholic doctrine of
transubstantiation held that the bread and wine of the Eucharist were
transformed into Christ's flesh and blood. In opposition to this doctrine,
the Swiss Reformer Ulrich Zwingli (1484-1531) insisted that Christ's
statement, "This is my body," at the Last Supper, could not have been
literally true and must therefore be taken in a symbolical or metaphorical
sense.68 Many Protestants argued that taking this statement literally led to
the "idolatry" of the Eucharistic meal. Archbishop Thomas Cranmer's
(1489-1556) catechism of the Ten Commandments identified several other
forms of verbal idolatry. Some said that kneeling before an image was not
the same as kneeling to it, but he dismissed this as a merely semantic
distinction, "painted words" rather than "painted colours." 69 Other forms
of verbal idolatry depended on an extension of the commandment against
taking the Lord's name in vain 70 to such practices as giving the name of
"God" to things which are not God, such as the sun, moon, and stars.7 1
Richard Greenham similarly included swearing by false gods in this
prohibition.72 The predilection for the so-called "plain style" coordinated
with a translation of the liturgy into the vernacular and a streamlining or
reduction of its rhetorical flourishes.7 3 Drawing on Matthew 6:7, Puritans
proscribed certain forms of prayer as "vain repetitions" associated with
rhetoric, magic, and idolatry. 74 The crime of image-worship was extended
from plastic to verbal images.
These theological debates and distinctions did not simply disappear with
the decline of traditional religion. As Moshe Halbertal and Avishai
Margalit suggest, the prohibition against idolatry was further developed by
the philosophers of the Enlightenment:
Our discussion of the causes of error in this chapter and of other
aspects of error in the next two chapters is based on an important
conceptual chain composed of the following links: the criticism of
68. ULRICH ZWINGLI, Eine klare underrichtung vom nachtmal Christi (1526), in 4 HULDRYCH
ZWINGLIS SAMTLICHE WERKE [HULDRYCH ZWINGLI ALL WORKS] 773 (E. Egli et al. eds., 1905).
69. THOMAS CRANMER, Cathechismus; that is to say, A short Instruction into the Christian
Religion, WRITINGS OF THE REV. DR. THOMAS CRANMER 101, 113 (London, Religious Tract Soc'y
1860).
70. Exodus 20:7.
71. CRANMER, supra note 69, at 122; cf id. at 80.
72. RICHARD GREENHAM, A Short Forme of Catechising, THE WORKS OF THE REVEREND AND
FAITHFULL SERVANT OF JESUS CHRIST M. RICHARD GREENHAM 401,411 (1599).
73. See THOMAS CRANMER, Introduction to THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER (1549).
74. JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, ch. XX, § 29, at 138 (John Allen
trans., 7th ed. 1947); Thomas Manton, Introduction to the Exposition of the Lord's Prayer, in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF THOMAS MANTON (London, 1870); John Whitgift, The Defence of the Answer
to the Admonition, Against the Reply of Thomas Cartwright, in THE WORKS OF JOHN WHiTGIFT 3:513-
17 (John Ayre ed., Cambridge, 1853).
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folk religion by the monotheistic religions, the criticism of idolatry
by the monotheistic religions, the criticism of folk religion by the
religious Enlightenment, the criticism of religion in general by the
secular Enlightenment, and finally the criticism of ideology. The
claim is that at every link of this chain the same intellectual moves
were made.75
They give as an example Bacon's complaint against different categories of
cognitive error he termed "idols of the mind. 76
A consideration of the philosophical critique of specifically linguistic
errors supports Halbertal's and Margalit's suggestion. Among Bacon's
"idols" were the "Idols of the Marketplace," 77 linguistic errors including
"names of things which do not exist . . . to which nothing in reality
corresponds. 78 Hobbes, in his Leviathan, developed such criticisms of
language much further. He insisted that all talk of "incorporeall
substance[s]," such as one heard from the scholastic theologians, was a
contradiction in terms.79 If such ideas did not translate from Latin into
clear English, there was a good reason, namely that they were nonsensical.
He connected such abuses of words, including especially the reification or
turning into noun substantives of qualitative or adjectival terms, with the
false doctrine of transubstantiation that held that the bread of the Eucharist
was literally transformed into Christ's body.80 Hobbes criticized the
overactive imaginations of the Gentiles that had populated nature with
innumerable spirits of different varieties, all of which were "Idols ... of
the braine." 81 He argued that originally in scripture the word "spirit"
meant only breath, and the word "angel" meant a messenger.82 Taking
these terms to signify incorporeal beings deprived them of all sense.
Similarly, the terms Satan and Devil were actually "Appellatives"
meaning "Enemy" and "Destroyer," which, when left untranslated, gave
the false impression that they were "the proper names of Daemons.'
83
Foreshadowing Bentham's later analysis of the word "church," Hobbes
argued that this word could be taken legitimately to mean one body or
75. HALBERTAL & MARGALIT, supra note 63, at 112.
76. Id. at 242-43.
77. FRANCIS BACON, THE NEW ORGANON 56 (Fulton H. Anderson ed., Prentice Hall 1960)
(1620).
78. ld. at 57.
79. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 4, at 30 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996)
(1651) (emphasis omitted).
80. Id. chs. 8, 44.
81. Id. ch. 44, at 418; see also id. ch. 45; cf. id. ch. 12. See generally id. ch. 45, "Of
Daemonology, and Other Reliques of the Religion of the Gentiles," for an extended discussion of
idolatry.
82. Id. ch. 34 (entitled "Of the Signification of Spirit, Angel, and Inspiration in the Books of Holy
Scripture").
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person only if there were a company of members united under one
sovereign. As there was no universal sovereign, there could be no single,
universal Church.84 Such impersonations needed to be stripped of
authority to make way for the other, legitimate artificial person of the
sovereign, represented by the Biblical image of the Leviathan. Therefore,
all (other) idols needed to be dethroned: "Idols cannot be Authors: for an
Idol is nothing., 85 Hobbes's empirical, etymological reduction called the
Bible's authority into question, although he argued that he was faithful to
the text. However, as A. P. Martinich has argued, Hobbes's
disenchantment of nature, and of scripture, does not fit neatly into the
label of "atheism.' 86 His concern with theology, especially in parts 3 and 4
of Leviathan, showed instead a profound continuity with Protestant
criticisms of certain forms of religion. His insistence on the political
importance of language bore a striking resemblance to Bentham' s.
Following Hobbes's earlier etymologies of the same terms, Locke
observed that "spirit, in its primary signification, is breath; angel, a
messenger., 87 Home Tooke greatly expanded such etymological analyses,
adding that terms such as "Heaven, Hell, . . . Fiend, Angel, Apostle, Saint,
Spirit" were not even true nouns, but
Participles and Adjectives, not understood as such, [which] have
caused a metaphysical jargon and a false morality, which can only be
dissipated by etymology. And, when they come to be examined, you
will find that the ridicule which Dr. Conyers Middleton has justly
bestowed upon the Papists for their absurd coinage of Saints, is
equally applicable to ourselves and to all other metaphysicians;
whose moral deities .. . are not less ridiculously coined and imposed
upon their followers."
Bentham, who had also read the Protestant theologian Conyers
Middleton (1683-1750) and embraced his project of returning to an
original Christianity by removing illegitimate additions thereto, 89
continued the etymological tradition: "[T]hat spirit means originally
breath ... is sufficiently notorious. In so far as any origin at all can be
found for it, it is in a material import that the origin of the import of every
84. Id. ch. 39.
85. Id. ch. 16, at 114.
86. A.P. MARTINICH, THE TWO GODS OF LEVIATHAN: THOMAS HOBBES ON RELIGION AND
POLITICS (1992).
87. 2 LOCKE, supra note 57, at 5.
88. 2 JOHN HORNE TOOKE, EPEA PTEROENTA; OR, THE DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY 18 (Menston,
Yorkshire, The Scolar Press 1968) (1805); cf. 2 id. at 20.
89. GAMALIEL SMITH [JEREMY BENTHAM AND FRANCIS PLACE], NOT PAUL, BUT JESUS, at iii
(London, John Hunt 1823).
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word is to be found." 90 The particular terms chosen for such etymological
analyses suggest that one of the goals of this tradition was to debunk the
belief in the existence of supernatural beings. This could, of course, lead
to atheism. However, Bentham officially declared God not a fictitious but
a real being, of the inferential rather than the perceptible variety. 91 He
exhibited no such scruple when it came to the Devil: "Exists there any
where any real being to which this name is applicable?,92 In the same
vein, he mocked depictions of the Holy Ghost as a dove, which he called a
"pigeon," and of the other persons of the Trinity as an "old man" and a
"young man., 93
Locke applied such criticisms beyond scripture and the names of
supernatural beings to language in general. He criticized especially the
habit of "taking words for things," or believing that they necessarily
reflect reality.94 Bentham shared his predecessor's general complaint
against the habit of reifying language: "[S]o close a union has habit
connected between words and things, that we take one for the other.
95
Like Locke,96 he argued that, in Aristotle's time, people were led by the
patterns of grammar to believe that a name or noun substantive implied
the existence of the thing it named.97 This error continued into the present:
Wherever there is a word, there is a thing; so says the common
notion-the result of the association of ideas. Wherever there is a
word, there is a thing; hence the almost universal practice of
confounding fictitious entities with real ones-corresponding names
of fictitious entities with real ones. Hence, common law, mind, soul,
virtue, vice.
98
Bentham occasionally depicted this error of reifying language as a kind
of personification or anthropomorphism:
Beholding at a distance, in the dress of a man, sitting and playing
upon an organ, an automaton figure, constructed for that purpose by
the ingenuity of the mechanist, to take this creature of human art for a
real man, is a sort of mistake which, at a certain distance, might
happen for a time to be made by the most acute observer. In like
manner, beholding a part of speech cast in the same mould with the
90. 8 BENTHAM, supra note 50, at 329; cf. de Champs, supra note 56.
91. 8 BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 196.
92. BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 9.
93. Id. at 22.
94. 2 LOCKE, supra note 57, at 132.
95. 10 JEREMY BENTHAM, Memoirs and Correspondence, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM,
supra note 10, at 3, 75.
96. 2 LOCKE, supra note 57, at 132; cf. HOBBES, supra note 79, ch. 46 (criticizing the
Aristotelians' use of "empty names").
97. 8 BENTHAM, supra note 48, at 238-39.
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name of a real entity, a really existing substance, no wonder if, on a
variety of occasions, to the mental eye of a very acute observer, this
fictitious entity thus accoutred should present itself in the character
of, and be regarded and treated as if it were a real one.
99
Elsewhere Bentham used a similar analogy to refer to the opposite
process of abstracting from things to words, a process he called
"spiritualization or psychologization . . . the psychological object being
modelled from the physical archetype, as a bust in clay from any part of
the human figure."' 00 As these passages make clear, there was a dark side
to the theory of empiricism: The path that illuminated language by
connecting words back to things also led to the shadow of fictions.
Whereas all legitimate (non-fictional) language proceeded from things to
words, permitting the process to be reversed without error, the same was
not true in the case of fictions. This was at the heart of what made fictions
so pernicious. Bentham's association of fictions with a process of
personification resonated with his own attack on the lawyer's invocation
of non-existent persons such as "John Doe," with earlier philosophers'
criticisms of linguistic "idols," and with religious complaints against
idolatry.
Bentham frequently applied the critique of personification specifically
to legal language, including the very phrase "Common Law." These
applications often explicitly invoked religious criticisms of idolatry.
Beginning already in the early A Fragment on Government (1776), he
suggested that the reverence of his opponent William Blackstone (1723-
1780) for the common law was "a kind of personification ... as if the Law
were a living creature."'' Only statute law is real, as it exists on the
printed page.0 2 The "Law of Nature" is "a word . . . ripened into a
tangible substance,"'0 3 and the common law, although granted priority by
lawyers, is actually the "Shadow of the Statute Law," as it was only from
the existence of statutes that the word "law" could have been abstracted in
the first place."°4 Common Law, or the Law of Nature with which
Blackstone paired it, described a fiction-a "set of imaginary objects,"' 05 a
99. 8 BENTHAM, supra note 49, at 129.
100. 8 BENTHAM, supra note 50, at 318-19. The analogies employed in these passages may have
owed something to Bentham's reading of James Harris, who argued that "[w]e may either behold
Speech, as divided into its constituent Parts, as a Statue may be divided into its several Limbs; or else,
as resolved into its Matter and Form, as the same Statue may be resolved into its Marble and Figure."
JAMES HARRIS, HERMES 2 (Menston, Yorkshire, The Scolar Press 1968) (1751); see also LIEBERMAN,
supra note 30, at 220 n.3, 263 n.32.
101. BENThAM, supra note 1, at 399.
102. Id. at 7; cf. id. at 162.
103. Id. at 21.
104. Id. at 119.
105. Id. at l.
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"metaphorical personage,"'10 6 a "non-entity," 10 7 a "mask... varnished,"'08
personified as Blackstone's "Divinity the Common Law" 09-which made
his discourse a "theological grimgribber.""' Bentham expanded this
analogy between the common law and idolatry:
The Common Law, in order to make it the fitter for adoration, was to
be turned into an abstruse and invisible quiddity and which like
certain Tyrants of the earth, was never to show itself in public: like
them it was to make its existence perceivable only by means of its
delegates: these judicial decisions, which whenever the Common
Law was asked for were to be produced corum [sic] populo [in
public], as the ostensible images of its person, not as themselves
being that thing, but as evidences of there being such a thing
somewhere. Thus, to use our Author's [Blackstone's] own apposite
similitude, the Oracles were not the words of the Pythia that spake
them, but her words were the evidence of an Apollo whose oracles
they were. ill
In affirming the validity of lex non scripta, or unwritten laws,
Blackstone had acknowledged the problem of how such laws are to be
known and recognized as valid. His answer to this problem was that "the
judges .. .are the depositaries of the laws; the living oracles, who must
decide in all cases of doubt.""' 2 Bentham now used Blackstone's analogy
against him. The common law was an idol, although an invisible one
which, by implication, did not exist. Lawyers disguised their self-serving
proclamations as the oracles of this non-existent deity.'13 Similarly,
Blackstone was guilty of "idolatry" of both the king as the authority
underwriting the common law,114  and Lord Coke, Blackstone's
predecessor as expositor of the law. 5
In his later writings on language and logic, Bentham returned to such
themes. He repeated the assertions that Reason,116 Nature," 7 Religion," 8
106. Id. at 216.
107. Id. at 20.
108. Id. at 124.
109. Id. at 228.
110. Id. at 10.
111. Id. at 195.
112. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *69.
113. Bentham here shifts o a different meaning of "oracle"-not the one who speaks the words
of the deity, but the words themselves. See 10 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 884 (2d ed. 1989).
114. BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 122; see also id. at412.
115. Id. at 174; cf. 2 BENTHAM, supra note 48, at 400 ("Lord Chief Justice Hale (to the present
hour chief god of the man of law's idolatry) ... .
116. 8 BENTHAM, supra note 49, at 77.
117. 8 id. at 125; see also 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, Three Tracts Relative to Spanish and Portuguese
Affairs, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 464, 501.




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2005
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
and Church'19 are words that denote "goddesses" or fictitious persons of
the female gender. Law, like the Church, was an "allegorical idol."'2 ° He
called dependence on the authority of tradition a "species of idolatry"
shared especially by law and religion that, if followed strictly, would
return authority over England to the Catholic Church."' A letter dated
1817 included in Bentham's Papers on Codification shows the continuity
of such ideas in his jurisprudence, as well as the extent of their connection
with religion:
To be known, an object must have existence. But not to have
existence-to be a mere non-entity-in this case, my friends, is a
portion-nay, by far the largest portion-of that which is passed
upon you for law. I speak of common law, as the phrase is: of the
whole of common law. When men say to you, the common law does
this-the common law does that-for whatsoever there is of reality,
look not beyond the two words that are thus employed. In these
words you have a name, pretended to be the name of a really existing
object: look for any such existing object-look for it till doomsday,
no such object will you find. Great is Diana of the Ephesians! cried
the priests of the Ephesian temple, by whom Diana was passed upon
the people as the name of a really existing goddess: Diana a goddess:
and of that goddess, the statue, if not the very person, at any rate the
express image. Great is Minerva of the Athenians! cried at that same
time-you need not doubt of it-the priests of the Temple of
Minerva at Athens: that Athens at which St. Paul made known, for
the first time, the unknown God. The priests of Athens had their
goddess of wisdom: it was this Minerva. The lawyers of the English
School have her twin sister, their Goddess of Reason. The law
(meaning the common law): "The law" (says one of her chief priests,
Blackstone) "is the perfection of reason." By the author of the book
on Ecclesiastical Polity, Hooker,-for between lawyercraft and
priestcraft there has always been the closest alliance-the law had
long before been discovered to be a supernatural person, and that
person of the feminine gender. Yes: exactly as much of reality was
there, and is there, corresponding to the word Minerva,-as there is,
or ever has been, corresponding to the compound appellative
common law. Would you wish to know what a law-a real law-is?
Open the statute-book: in every statute you have a real law: behold in
that the really existing object: the genuine object, of which the
counterfeit, and pretended counterpart, is endeavoured to be put off
upon you by a lawyer, as often as in any discourse of his the word
119. 2 BENTHAM, supra note 48, at 448-49; see also 8 BENTHAM, supra note 48, at 249-50.
120. 2 BENTHAM, supra note 48, at 448.
121. 2 id. at 392-93.
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common law is to be found.
122
The line "Great is Diana of the Ephesians" and the reference to the
Athenians worshipping an "unknown God" come from passages in the
Acts of the Apostles depicting Paul's preaching of the Gospel among
idolaters. 123 The same line was quoted by the Presbyterian reformer John
Knox in 1550, at the beginning of a famous sermon characterizing the
Catholic Mass as idolatry.' 24 Bentham refers disparagingly to Richard
Hooker (1554-1600) who, in his Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, had
defended the Church of England against the Puritans. 12 5 Bentham took up
where the Puritans had left off, condemning the Church for its idolatry.
With such references, he made explicit his own appropriation of Protestant
polemics, and placed himself in the role of a new Paul, preacher of a
Gospel of written law opposed to the unwritten law of idolaters. Under the
influence of empiricism, which insisted that all real entities were
individuals, Bentham argued that the (singular) term "a law" had meaning
only when applied to a statute law, which was discrete, existed on the
printed page, and could be pointed to. 126 He apparently referred to this
passage one year later, in Church-of-Englandism and its Catechism
Examined (1818), where he mentioned his "papers on codification" and
once again called the common law the "goddess of so many idolatries." 127
Later in the same work, he repeated the criticism that legal "fictions" were
the oracles of the "grim Idol, to which, day by day, under the name of
Common Law, so many lives and fortunes are sacrificed."12 8 The frauds of
priests and lawyers were the same; both "number [Precedent] among
[their] Gods."'
29
The specific charge Bentham made against common lawyers closely
resembled the one Conyers Middleton made against the Catholic Church
in a well-known letter recounting a journey to Rome, during which he
encountered all manners of "idolatry" that the Catholics had continued
from pagan times. 3° Jonathan Z. Smith summarizes Middleton's
explanation for this corruption of God's word:
122. 10 BENTHAM, supra note 95, at 483.
123. Acts 19:28, 19:34, 17:23.
124. John Knox, A Vindication of the Doctrine that the Sacrifice of the Mass is Idolatry, in 3 THE
WORKS OF JOHN KNOX 29 (David Laing ed., Edinburgh, Johnstone & Hunter 1854).
125. RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY (J. M. Dent, 1907) (1593).
126. 10 BENTHAM, supra note 95, at 483-84.
127. BENTHAM, supra note 29, at xli-xlii.
128. Id. at 230.
129. Id. at 231.
130. CONYERS MIDDLETON, A LETTER FROM ROME SHEWING AN EXACT CONFORMITY BETWEEN
POPERY AND PAGANISM (London, Richard Manby, 5th ed. 1742). For specific references to "idolatry,"
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What had occurred, Middleton believes, was a process of linguistic
sleight of hand. He returns to this theme insistently. The present ritual
activities are but "verbal Translations of the old Originals of
Heathenism." "By a Change only of Name they have found the
means to return to the Thing." They have "changed the Name rather
than the Object of their Worship."'
3 1
This is precisely what Bentham argued half a century and more after
Middleton. Whereas the Ephesians named their idol Diana, and the
Athenians named her Minerva, English lawyers of the present day called
her the "Common Law." By any name, this was idolatry.
Bentham's persistent identifications of the common law and other
fictitious entities as idols of the feminine variety established an opposition,
not only between canon and idolatry, but also between male and female.
This curious feature of his jurisprudence requires some comment. One
factor in these associations was likely the traditional identification of the
true God as male. Goodrich has also noted that the earlier common-law
tradition opposed itself to the misleading and seductive power of images
that were, more frequently than not, conceived as feminine.'32 By
excluding both images and the feminine, the law in this way symbolically
overdetermined its specific difference from its multiple Others, and
reinforced the male hierarchy of legal practitioners.
Bentham's appropriation of such religious polemics was neither
superficial nor haphazard. Instead, it shows the depth of influence of
Protestant thinking on general culture. The same influences affected
thinking on language well into the second half of the nineteenth century, if
not beyond. The Sanskritist and historian of religion Friedrich Max MUller
(1823-1900) was influenced by the same philosophical tradition that
influenced Bentham. MUller's theory of myth as a "disease of language"
debunked the process by which language becomes reified and, ultimately,
deified, in terms that recalled earlier religious attacks on idolatry:
"[N]ames have a tendency to become things, nomina [names] grow into
numina [spirits], ideas into idols . . . ."' It is, therefore, not very
surprising that Lon Fuller, in his analysis of legal fictions, quoted the by-
then-already-obscure MUller on the manner in which abstract terms are
derived from concrete ones through a process of metaphor.'34 Fuller
stated: "That original sin of human reasoning-hypostatization-is a
failure to drop the fictions out of the final reckoning."' 35 The
131. JONATHAN Z. SMITH, TO TAKE PLACE 98 (1987) (quoting MIDDLETON, supra note 130).
132. GOODRICH, supra note 12, at 108-80.
133. 2 FRIEDRICH MAX MOLLER, LECTURES ON THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE 466 (Scribner,
Armstrong, London 1874).
134. FULLER, supra note 38, at 15.
135. Id. at 118.
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condemnation of the "original sin" of idolatry links not only law and
religion, but also legal studies and religious studies.
AN ICONOCLAST TO THE END: REVISITING BENTHAM'S "ATHEISM"
This brings to a conclusion the analysis of Bentham's critique of
fictions and its connections with earlier attacks on idolatry. Now it is time
to address several broader questions that were raised by this analysis.
What are we to make of Bentham's borrowings of religious terminology,
and of the parallels between his jurisprudence and the religious opposition
of canon and idolatry? Do these convergences make his jurisprudence
"religious," and if so, in what sense? Does his particular case tell us
anything about the status of modem, secular law as a "religion"? These
broader questions, especially the last one, cannot be resolved here.
However, in light of the earlier analysis it would be irresponsible not to
raise them.
To attempt answers to these questions, we shall first have to revisit
Bentham's views on religion. Scholars until recently have been
discouraged from examining these views for a number of reasons. The
first is the assumption that the "rational" theory of Utilitarianism can have
little to do with "irrational" systems of thought such as religion-despite
the fact that religious versions of Utilitarianism, such as that of William
Paley (1743-1805), preceded and were, for a time, more popular than
Bentham's own version.136 Another reason is Bentham's overt hostility to
religion. As previously noted, he was a strident critic of traditional
religion, and sought to separate law from its influence. Moreover, his
critique of fictions evinced a skepticism regarding the existence of
supernatural beings that could easily lead to atheism, even if he officially
classified God as an "inferential" rather than a "fictitious" entity.'37 The
third reason is the suppression of Bentham's voluminous writings on
religion.' 
38
During his lifetime, Bentham published several major writings on
religion: Church-of-Englandism and its Catechism Examined (1818); An
Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion on the Temporal Happiness
of Mankind (1822), with George Grote; and Not Paul, But Jesus (1823),
with Francis Place. 13 The second and third were published under the
pseudonyms Philip Beauchamp and Gamaliel Smith, respectively,
136. See UTILITARIANS AND RELIGION (James E. Crimmins ed., 1998).
137. 8 BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 196.
138. See JAMES CRIMMINS, SECULAR UTILITARIANISM: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE CRITIQUE OF
RELIGION IN THE THOUGHT OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1-5 (1990); MACK, supra note 38, at 305.
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presumably to avoid public criticism and a potential blasphemy charge.
Bentham had also tried, without success, to publish Church-of-
Englandism anonymously. Also noteworthy among Bentham's writings on
religion is the satirical pamphlet "Auto-Icon" discussed below. None of
these writings appeared in the collected edition of Bentham's works
published in 1843 by his disciple and executor, John Bowring, a
circumstance that has hindered the proper appreciation of Bentham' s ideas
on religion.
Recently, especially through the efforts of James Crimmins, some of
these writings have been republished and reinterpreted. 140 Bentham's
writings on religion are at least apparently either a continuation or an
extension of a standard Protestant project to purify Christianity by
removing illegitimate accretions to the words of Jesus. Church-of
Englandism argued for the removal of any additions to the Gospel made
by the Church, including the 39 articles of faith sworn to by adherents. No
interpretation, including the distillation represented by the catechism,
should be allowed to take the place of a direct engagement with scripture.
Not Paul, But Jesus argued for the illegitimacy of any additions made to
Jesus's own words by the apostle Paul. The Analysis of Natural Religion
made a characteristically Utilitarian argument against religion. However,
its criticisms were limited to "natural religion," which, as opposed to
"revealed religion," lacked the support of scripture:' 4 1 "Revelation alone
communicates a known and authoritative code, with which the actual
conduct of believers may be compared and the points of conformity or
separation ascertained."'' 42 Of course, this distinction avoided a direct
confrontation with Christianity, which was likely Bentham's real target.
He came close in this work to advocating atheism, but stopped just short
of doing so. 143 There was at least one point on which Bentham's
arguments regarding religion agreed with his jurisprudence--on the
location of authority in a written canon delimited through the paring away
of all unauthorized additions thereto made by custom or otherwise.
Bentham's life ended on a bizarre note, one relevant to the issue of
whether his Utilitarianism was a form of secular religion. Against
prevailing prejudices, he willed his body to medical science for dissection
and the advancement of anatomical knowledge. This showed an absolute
consistency to find practical usage for every last scrap of matter. However,
his further instructions for the disposition of the corpse were less
obviously rational. He directed that his body be preserved, then displayed
140. See UTILITARIANS AND RELIGION, supra note 136; BENTHAM, supra note 31.
141. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 20, at 20-21.
142. Id. at 88.
143. Id. at 124.
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in perpetuity in University College, London, where it indeed stands to this
day. (The original head was replaced with a wax one owing to the
deleterious effects of the embalming process on the original's features.)
He called this figure an "Auto-Icon," and authored a short satirical essay
with that title that remained unpublished until 2002, although a few copies
had been distributed after Bentham's death. Several themes in this essay
are of interest. Bentham proposed that Auto-Icons become the standard
treatment for the dead, and that they be displayed in churches attended by
phrenologists in preference to priests. He explicitly invoked the theme of
"every man his own lawyer," adding that "now may every man be his own
statue."'" Henceforth stone statues could be dispensed with, as "What
resemblance, what painting, what statue of a human being can be so like
him, as, in the character of an Auto-Icon, he or she will be to himself or
herself. Is not identity preferable to similitude?" '45 The same theory of
representation or signification informing his concept of a code, namely
that, so far as possible, there should be an identity between a thing and its
verbal image, informed his argument for the Auto-Icon as an analogue of
autobiography, or rather "auto-thanatography"1 46: "Names may be
invented-can be forged; and the existence of persons bearing them can
be asserted ... But Auto-Icons cannot be invented, cannot be forged."'
47
There was also an element of illusion at play here. Bentham suggested that
famous Auto-Icons be made to move and discourse in a theatrical tableau
reminiscent of the Hall of Presidents at Disneyland. This recalls his use of
the image of the piano-playing automaton to illustrate the personification
of language.
Like its verbal counterpart, the code, the Auto-Icon was a critique of
false images and a mode of iconoclasm. The intention was, in part, to
parody the religious practice of image-worship, as well as burial practices
that, as Bentham argued (echoing Puritan theologians148), were not
sanctioned by any words of Jesus, but were designed solely for priestly
enrichment. 49 Earlier, Bentham had stated: "Another cause of delusion...
is the reigning prejudice in favour of the dead-a prejudice which in
former times contributed more than anything else to the practice of
idolatry: the dead were speedily elevated to the rank of divinities; the
superstitious invoked them, and ascribed a miraculous efficacy to their
relics."'15 Despite such reservations, or with tongue firmly in cheek, he
144. BENTHAM, supra note 31, at 2.
145. Id. at 3.
146. Id. at 2.
147. Id. at5.
148. See, e.g., 2 HOOKER, supra note 125, at 405 (addressing such Puritan objections).
149. BENTHAM, supra note 31, at 16.
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proposed a ceremonial use for the Auto-Icons, a kind of secular
replacement for religion: "On certain days the Auto-Icons might be
exhibited, and their exhibition associated with religious observances."151
He referred to the possibility that pilgrimages might be made to his own
"quasi sacred Auto-Icon (if by the adverb, the attribute sacred may be
rendered endurable)."' 52 This echoed a dream he once had, in which he
saw himself as the "founder of a sect."'
53
How are we to understand such utterances? The "Auto-Icon" was surely
a parody or satire of traditional religion, even though its recommendations
were partly followed in the case of Bentham's corpse. This supports a
more subversive reading of his other writings on religion. Crimmins
argues that Bentham was an atheist, whose ultimate intent was to
undermine all religion. 54 As it was dangerous to criticize the Church
directly, he directed his arguments against various substitutes or straw
men-the Catechism, the apostle Paul, and "natural religion." Crimmins
calls these arguments "devices" or "tactics,'' 55 like "the Devil quoting
scripture": 156 "Bentham knew his Bible well and rarely missed an
opportunity to quote from it whenever it might embarrass the Church or
contradict its teaching."'' 57 Yet Crimmins also acknowledges that "it is
obvious that Bentham found it almost impossible to divorce his train of
thought from the practices of conventional religion."'
158
Crimmins argues that Bentham's religion-his atheism-was integral to
his thought. Philip Schofield has countered that Bentham's theory of logic
and language was integral to his thought, whereas his religious views were
not.' 59 Consequently,
[W]hether or not one concludes that Bentham was an atheist of some
sort, . . . Bentham's views in relation to the existence of God were
derived from his theory of logic and language .... Bentham did not
have a theology because, according to his theory of logic and
language, there was none to be had ....
... Bentham was "secular" not in the sense that his starting point was
a rejection of religious belief, but in that his starting point was
151. BENTHAM, supra note 31, at 3.
152. Id. at 15.
153. See CRIMMINS, supra note 138, at 287.
154. See id. at 205, 211,282.
155. Id. at 174, 205, 230.
156. Id. at 174.
157. Id. at 134.
158. Id. at 299.
159. Philip Schofield, Political and Religious Radicalism in the Thought of Jeremy Bentham, 20
HIST. POL. THOUGHT 272, 276 (1999). For a response, see James Crimmins, Bentham's Religious
Radicalism Revisited: A Response to Schofield, 22 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 494 (2001).
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independent of religious belief."6
On balance, I would have to agree with Crimmins. The earlier analysis
of Bentham's theory of fictions indicates that his views on language were
deeply influenced by religious criticisms of idolatry, which were taken
partly from scripture and theology, and partly from a philosophical
tradition that condemned the personification of words. It appears
increasingly anachronistic to call this philosophical tradition "secular" in
the modem sense of the term. In fact, the long-standing engagement of
this tradition with religion lends greater significance to Bentham's own
appropriation of religious terminology. It is possible to argue that his use
of theological idioms was a rhetorical device, designed to communicate
and popularize covertly and essentially "secular" conceptions of language.
However, it now appears more likely that religion contributed to the basic
structure of Bentham's thought concerning language, and especially the
language of the law. This fundamental structure borrowed from the
opposition between canon and idolatry. Whereas other, non-religious
influences also informed Bentham's linguistic and jurisprudential theories,
it is the religious influences that have been most neglected by scholarship.
Ironically, this neglect was reinforced by Bentham's overt hostility to
religion, despite the fact that this hostility itself now appears to have deep
affinities with Reformation polemics.
Bentham's jurisprudence was "religious" in a fundamental and not a
superficial sense. He may well have been, as Crimmins argues, an atheist,
if by this we mean an opponent of traditional religion who believes that
God is a fiction. Yet Bentham's opposition to religion shared in several
important characteristics of the religious Reformation-its devotion to the
printed book, its democratizing tendencies, and its hostility to certain
customs or habits of thought and language, regarded as idolatry. If
"atheist" means someone who simply lacks religious belief, then a more
accurate term for Bentham is "iconoclast." This places him in an historical
line of development that led from religion to secularism. The
disappearance of God began with the prohibition against idolatry in the
Ten Commandments, and with God's refusal to let even Moses see him
face-to-face: "[Y]ou cannot see my face; for man shall not see me and
live."'' For his proposition that God is an inferential entity, Bentham
cited the New Testament statement that "no man hath seen God at any
time."' 62 Such views led directly to the iconoclasm of the Reformation.
160. Schofield, supra note 159, at 280-81, 291.
161. Exodus 33:20 (Revised Standard).
162. 8 BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 196. Although Bentham attributes this statement to St. Paul,
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Bentham was neither the first person, nor even the first lawyer, to build his
canon on the foundation of iconoclasm. However, he may have taken
iconoclasm to its logical endpoint, by banishing the face of God from both
law and language.
The more important issue is not whether we should label Bentham
"religious" or "secular," but what a study of religion contributes to our
understanding of his jurisprudence and later developments in the law. As
Goodrich and Douzinas argue, religious iconoclasm facilitated the
construction of the law as an ostensibly purified, perfected, universal
language. Bentham's case sharply illuminates the contributions of
monotheism and the prohibition of idolatry to this linguistic project. 163 The
verbal analogue of monotheism is the monologue of a univocal language,
one that fixes the relation between the word and the world. And the
integrity of such a language depends on the exclusion of polyphony,
ambiguity, and distortion, the verbal analogues of polytheism. As
Bentham argued, "Identity of nomenclature is certificate of identity of
nature: diversity of diversity:-how absurd, how inconsistent to make the
certificate a false one!"" Moreover, for absolute clarity and consistency
in the code, "every draught [should] . . . be from beginning to end, if
possible, the work of a single hand. Hands not more than one."'165 This is,
if you like, monotheism without religion. Bentham represented an extreme
or nodal point of this monologic, a point at which religion vanished into
secularism.
The secularization thesis, or the standard historical account of how law
gradually disentangled itself from religion in its onward progress toward
modernity, has achieved the status of a charter myth, a monologue by and
for the law. However, there are already visible cracks in this monolith,
gaps that disclose the extent to which law is a development that occurred
within religion itself, through an increasing restriction of the sphere of the
sacred. If we characterize the Secular simply as a movement critical of the
Sacred, that is, of religion, then where in this bipolar or dichotomous
classification do we locate the Reformation and the prohibition of
idolatry? Criticism of religion is, as we have seen, not necessarily the
opposite of religion. The Protestant attack on idolatry, which opposed
"true" religion to "false," is a case in point. Throughout history, some of
the most potent criticisms of religion have been developed by religion
itself; and some of these remain, half-buried and mostly forgotten, within
163. See Robert A. Yelle, Images of Law and its Others: Canon and Idolatry in the Discourses of
British India, 6 CULTURE AND RELIGION 181 (2005) (describing the application in colonial India of
Bentham's idea of a code as a universal language).
164. 10 BENTHAM, supra note 95, at 73.
165. 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, Codification Proposal, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra
note 10, at 534, 554.
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the text of modern law.
Autobiography is a genre of fiction. So too is monologue. That is why
we need a Comparative Jurisprudence engaged in dialogue with other
disciplines, including religious studies. Jurisprudence is too important to
be left to those whose object is to "save the appearances" of law and
especially the integrity of its verbal pronouncements, in the mode of
theologians of an earlier age.
29
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